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I
n 2008, the United States government mandated transition of
internationally managed HIV care and treatment programs to
local country ownership. Three case studies illustrate the US
Health Resources Services Administration’s fiscal assessment
and technical assistance (TA) processes to strengthen local
organizations’ capabilities to absorb and manage United States
government funding. Review of initial, TA and follow-up reports
reveal that the 1 Botswanan and 2 Zambian organizations closed
10 of 17 financial capacity gaps, with Health Resources Services
Administration assisting on 2. Zambian organizations requested
and absorbed targeted TA on the basis of the consultant’s desk
review, their finance staff revised fiscal policies and procedures,
and accordingly trained other staff. In Botswana, delays in
integrating recommendations necessitated on-site TA for
knowledge building and role modeling. Organizational maturity
may explain differences in responsiveness, ownership, and
required TA approaches. Clarifying expectations of capacity
building, funding agreement, and nonmonetary donor
involvement can help new organizations determine and act on
intervening actions.
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During phase I of the US President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the US Congress rapidly de-
ployed US $15 billion to ameliorate HIV-related mor-
bidity and mortality and the accompanying burden
on individuals, families, and health systems in 15 fo-
cus countries.1,2 At the outset, 4 US-based academic
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and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) success-
fully competed for PEPFAR funds to introduce urgently
needed HIV care and treatment services through the
PEPFAR-initiated “Rapid Expansion of Antiretroviral
Programs to HIV Infected Persons in Selected Coun-
tries in Africa and the Caribbean under the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,” also known as the
Track 1.0 Care and Treatment Program.3 In 2008, the
US Department of Health & Human Services mandated
the transition of HIV care and treatment programs from
US-based implementing partners to host governments
and indigenous local partners.∗
The Obama Administration’s subsequent Global
Health Initiative supported the increasing emphasis on
country ownership for PEPFAR phase II (2009-2013).4
Track 1.0 implementing partners rose to the challenge,
demonstrating strong leadership and creativity in pro-
viding the technical assistance (TA) needed to tran-
sition emergency HIV care and treatment services to
country-led, sustainable programs. They continued to
work closely with host governments and increased
their efforts to strengthen select local partners’ capac-
ity to provide sustainable clinical oversight through
reliable and compliant systems for administrative, fi-
nancial, and grants management of Track 1.0 care and
treatment programs.5
The transition from US-based organizations to local
partners required a change in the flow of funding. Pre-
transition funds flowed from the Office of the Global
AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) at the Department of State
to the Department of Health & Human Services and
subsequently to the implementing agency, the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), and
HRSA awarded the funds to its US-based academic and
NGOs implementing partners who then transferred
funds as needed to their country offices. Posttransition,
for organizations funded by HRSA, the funding would
flow directly from the OGAC through HSS to the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of-
fices in-country to host governments and local partners.
This dramatic change created the need for collaboration
between key stakeholders to ensure a high level of fi-
nancial capacity and accountability from local partners
in managing direct US government (USG) funding.
These key stakeholders included HRSA, the US-based
∗To meet the definition of a local partner, the Office of the
Global AIDS Coordinator requires that the partner organization
be legally organized under the laws of the host country; 66% ben-
eficially owned by citizens or permanent residents of the country
(51% for fiscal year (FY) 2009-2010, 75% for FY 2013); and be
staffed and managed by 66% citizens or permanent residents of
the host country (51% for FY 2009-2010, 75% for FY 2013). Entities
with a board of directors are required to have 51% membership
on that board also be citizens or permanent residents of the host
country.2
funding/monitoring agency working with OGAC; US-
based international NGOs funded by HRSA to manage
large HIV support programs; local partners and host
governments subcontracted by international NGOs;
and the in-country CDC offices that would eventually
manage direct funding to local partners posttransition.
Consequently, HRSA adapted its TA framework,
successfully used to strengthen domestic AIDS ser-
vice organizations through the Ryan White Care Act,
to support Track 1.0 implementing partners’ efforts
to strengthen local partners in multiple resource-
constrained settings.6 Health Resources Services Ad-
ministration developed and implemented the Clinical
Assessment for Systems Strengthening (ClASS) frame-
work with the contractual support of the International
Training and Education Center for Health at the Uni-
versity of Washington and the University of California,
San Francisco.7
The theoretical model that best fits the ClASS frame-
work is that of the much evolved Appreciative Inquiry
as described by Bushe.8 The application of Apprecia-
tive Inquiry is based on grounded observations on
existing organizational strengths. The appreciation of
strengths promotes dialogue on areas where further
strengthening is needed to realize organizations’ as-
pirations and encourages organizations to experiment
with and adapt best practices to achieve the desired
outcomes. The ClASS framework serves as an inter-
vention facilitated by reviewers skilled at generating
positive affect, hope, aspirations, and authentic engage-
ment required to increase stakeholder receptiveness to
new ideas. Being uninvolved in daily program activ-
ities, the reviewers can challenge stakeholders to re-
consider current practices. The ClASS implementation
helps governments and other local partners to consider
their strengths and donor expectations to motivate nor-
mative and procedural changes to meet their organiza-
tional goals.
In practice, the ClASS framework’s unique ap-
proach favors a participatory, holistic assessment over
an audit. As a result, the assessment team, comprising
HRSA project officers, in-country CDC officers, expert
reviewers, Track 1.0 implementing partners, and local
partners’ personnel, jointly identify an organization’s
administrative, fiscal and technical strengths, and
opportunities for improvement. The ClASS framework
aims to build mutual trust through the collaborative
development of the scope of work and an expert-
driven assessment and review process. The ClASS
reviewers use qualitative interview methods to assess
and make recommendations specific to each local
partner. Thereafter, local partners develop action plans
and immediately begin building their organizational
capacity using internal resources. Local partners
can request targeted TA when needed and assume
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the responsibility for institutionalizing the new or
enhanced capacity. Through follow-up ClASS visits,
HRSA project officers monitor progress in addressing
capacity gaps, and reviewers provide additional input
to further enhance the organization’s capacity to
implement quality HIV care and treatment programs.
This article presents 3 case studies that illustrate the
application of the ClASS framework for strengthening
financial management by 3 local partners in Botswana
and Zambia. Although offered to all 26 local partners
reviewed between August 2010 and November 2011,
only these local partners requested direct HRSA as-
sistance to implement recommendations for stronger
financial management and they, therefore, provided
HRSA the opportunity to test the ClASS framework
in its entirety. Primary components of PEPFAR II and
the Global Health Initiative prioritize financial manage-
ment, accountability, and planning systems in the tran-
sition to local partners to assure Congress and the US
public of due diligence and fiduciary responsibility.9,10
Possible explanations for the similarities and differ-
ences between the 3 cases and lessons learned from the
provision of TA to strengthen financial management
are also discussed.
● Methods
The first author reviewed reports from initial and
follow-up ClASS visits conducted between August
2010 and November 2011 to gather recommendations
for improvement, identify resolved and outstanding ca-
pacity gaps, and gather new recommendations for im-
proved financial management made to the 3 local part-
ners. The 3 organizations were chosen from a pool of 26
local partners that received assessments from August
2010 to November 2011. The 3 local partners (≈10%)
were the only ones to receive expert driven, HRSA-
funded TA on the basis of either self-request or at the
direction of the HRSA Project Officer.
The TA consultant formatted the reports as per the
specifications of the HRSA scope of work. The report
was read for processes used, analysis of the problems,
TA provided, and outcome. The subsequent ClASS re-
port written by the fiscal reviewer was used to vali-
date the information provided in the TA reports. The
TA reports were reviewed to understand the nature of
assistance provided and its expected impact on finan-
cial management. The number and type of financial
management opportunities for improvement pre- and
post-TA were compared for each local partner. The role
of HRSA-supported TA in these improvements, as well
as its scope and impact, was considered in relation to
the structure and maturity of the organization. Tables 1
and 2 summarize some of the common financial man-
agement concerns, their relevance to capacity build-
ing, as well as the impact of TA on subsequent gaps
identified at follow-up. The Figure links some of the
identified areas for improvement with the specific
TA interventions and improvements noted during the
follow-up assessment.
The activities described in this article did not meet
the US federal definition of human subjects research.
As such, the University of Washington Human Sub-
jects Division determined that human subjects ethics
review and oversight was not required for these
activities.
Case study settings and process
Each case study includes a description of the organiza-
tion; the financial management-related opportunities
for improvement resulting from the ClASS assessment;
the subsequent TA requested and provided; and the
resulting capacity enhancements.
In each case, the HRSA planning process and as-
sessment implementation process was identical. Six to
12 months before an assessment, an HRSA project of-
ficer began working with the Track 1.0 implementing
partner and local partners to initiate the participatory
assessment process through conference calls with lead-
ership staff. HRSA, with assistance from International
Training and Education Center for Health, selected a
team of expert reviewers, including a finance consul-
tant, who read background documents to prepare for
the assessment. The expert reviewers participated in a
second call with the Track 1.0 implementing partner
and local partner leadership to fine-tune the assess-
ment scope of work and to address initial questions on
the basis of the advance documents provided to the as-
sessment team. Once on-site, the fiscal reviewer (along
with other team members assessing administrative and
clinical program functions) conducted qualitative in-
terviews, followed by document verification over a pe-
riod of several days. At the end of the visit, the fiscal
reviewer facilitated a discussion with leadership and
staff on the strengths identified in the finance systems
along with opportunities for improvement. The fiscal
reviewer documented their observations in a written
report that HRSA forwarded to the Track 1.0 imple-
menting partner to share with each proposed local part-
ner as well as applicable USG field staff.
The ClASS financial module utilized in each of
these case studies was identical and focused on ar-
eas key to USG regulatory compliance and best
practices around accountability and transparency,
including program financial management; financial
management policies and procedures; budget man-
agement; financial management information systems;
accounting systems (payroll, documentation, internal
Copyright © 2015 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
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TABLE 1 ● Common Priority Financial Management Capacity Concerns and Relevance to Capacity Building
                                                                                                                    
Common Priority Financial Management Concerns Relevance to Capacity Building
Annual audit not completed
Audit findings around retirement of travel advances not resolved
Policy to advance cash to local sites does not meet USG regulations
Meeting standards increases ability to maintain USG funding and improves
opportunities for new sources of funding through demonstrated
accountability and transparency
Finance and Accounting Policy and Procedure Manual was generally
weak, outdated, or did not specifically address one or more of the
following issues: reasonable distribution of incurred costs,
allowable costs, or treatment of administrative fees
Complete and updated manual provides guidance and instructions that
support consistent and accurate financial management
Grants Management Manual does not adequately explain cost
allocation methodologies
A separate manual for grants management policies and practices improves
accountability and supervision of subcontractors
Lack of grants management processes and subcontracting/bidding
processes
Time and effort (payroll) tracking not in place to match grants
Lack of adequate infrastructure and staffing in finance department Adequate staffing/resources and clear supervision reduces costly staff
turnover and decreases common errors
Poor oversight of finance department staff and activities
Board of directors not receiving/approving regular financial
statements
Informed board members leads to better decision making and ensures
members fulfill fiduciary roles and responsibilities
Lack of internal controls in place Improving separation of duties helps protect against fraud
Abbreviation: USG, United States government.
controls, and cash management); accounts payable
and receivable; procurement, purchasing, inventory,
and travel; financial management program monitoring
and oversight; and grants, contracts, and subcontract
management.7
Case study #1
An NGO in Zambia, identified to assume responsibil-
ity of a care and treatment program from a US-based
partner, underwent an initial comprehensive HRSA
assessment, including a finance capacity review, dur-
ing a 10-day period in May 2010. The organization
managed 135 health facilities in Zambia, accounting for
about 50% of the health services in rural Zambia and
about 30% of the health services countrywide. The or-
ganization manages a substantial budget of more than
US $49 million with funding from 7 different donors.
The organization is supported by a structure that in-
cludes department heads, regional offices, and a strong
base of community-level workers/volunteers.
Following a HRSA assessment in May of 2010, this
organization received 5 specific recommendations to
improve financial management (Table 2). The HRSA
encouraged the Track 1.0 implementing partner and
local partners to make related improvements and of-
fered HRSA-funded TA as needed. In the subsequent
12 months, the HRSA project officer monitored the
progress on priority issues related to transition as well
as on more general opportunities for improvement. The
local partner, through the Track 1.0 implementing part-
ner, requested TA to meet only 1 of the 5 recommen-
dations. Specifically, the local partner requested TA to
complete a Finance and Accounting Policies and Pro-
cedures Manual (FAPPM) that was responsive to USG
funding requirements and that also addressed policies
TABLE 2 ● Summary of Priority Financial Management Capacity Concerns During Initial Assessment and at Follow-up
Across all 3 Case Studies
                                                                                                                    
Number of Priority Financial
Management Capacity Concerns LP/Case Study #1 LP/Case Study #2 LP/Case Study #3
During initial assessment 5 2 10
Resolved with or without IP support 3 1 4
Resolved with HRSA support 1 1 0
Not resolved at follow-up 1 0 6
Abbreviations: HRSA, Health Resources Services Administration; LP, local partner.
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FIGURE ● Examples of Finance Problems Identified and Resolutions Following TA
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Abbreviations: TA, Technical assistance; USG, United States government.
and procedures associated with effective financial man-
agement systems. Rather than providing a consultant
to create an FAPPM, HRSA contracted a US-based in-
ternational consultant to support the local partner to
create their own policies and procedures in the hope of
enhancing organizational capacity and sustainability
of the changes. Finance TA consultants were typically
accountants familiar with USG regulations and refer
to individuals used to exclusively provide TA either
between or after regular ClASS assessments.
Over a period of 3 months, beginning in July
2011, the finance TA consultant exchanged e-mails
and phone calls with the organization’s finance and
administration manager on matching the organiza-
tion’s policies and procedures to USG regulatory re-
quirements. The director of the Track 1.0 implement-
ing partner organization participated in the discussions
and monitored local partner progress on recommended
changes. The TA resulted in a fully revised FAPPM that
reflected USG regulations, specifically those related
to cost allocation, asset management, cash manage-
ment, separation of duties, and other risk management
policies, as well as adaptations to the organization’s
software to accommodate these changes. The organi-
zation’s finance and administration manager felt confi-
dent enough with the revisions to present the changes
to the organization’s management team and to provide
the subsequent internal training to the finance and ac-
counting staff. The TA was low cost because the con-
sultant did not need to travel to Zambia and the orga-
nization’s staff did the majority of the work to rewrite
policies and procedures and develop the internal train-
ings. The Track 1.0 implementing partner organization
and the local partner worked on the implementation of
the new policies and procedures.
HRSA conducted a follow-up assessment over a 10-
day period in November 2011, 18 months following the
initial assessment. A different financial management
reviewer conducted the subsequent finance capacity
assessment and noted significant improvements both
in the quantity and quality of the finance and account-
ing policies and procedures and in staff knowledge of
USG regulations. The consultant requested 1 clarifica-
tion in the FAPPM and, separately, noted that 1 other
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recommended change was pending, most likely due to
competing priorities and time constraints. Overall, by
the time of the follow-up assessment, 3 of the 5 original
opportunities for improvement were addressed by the
local partner with support from the Track 1.0 imple-
menting partner and the fourth with HRSA-sponsored
TA (Table 2).
Case study #2
During the same 10-day period in May 2010, a second
NGO in Zambia that had been identified as a potential
local partner was assessed by a ClASS team.
This 14-year-old organization managed public
health clinics and orphan care, generating income
through the provision of education and conference
services. In the previous 10 years, it oversaw the
management of 3 HIV treatment facilities in Zambia.
The organization managed approximately US $12.8
million from 10 different donors.
The fiscal reviewer identified 2 key opportunities
for improvement related to USG regulations (Table 2).
One year later, in April 2011, at the request of the lo-
cal partner and the Track 1.0 implementing partner,
HRSA contracted an international finance consultant to
assist the organization in completing their FAPPM to
ensure that it was responsive to USG funding require-
ments and that it addressed other common policies and
procedures associated with effective financial manage-
ment systems. In addition, the HRSA project officer
requested that the consultant provide samples and re-
source documents as needed to reinforce and support
policy and procedural changes.
During the course of the next 3 months, the con-
sultant reviewed the local partner’s existing FAPPM
(last updated in 2009) and the FAPPM of another local
NGO (considered a good model for USG regulatory
compliance) and compared and contrasted the 2
financial management manuals. The consultant then
developed an “Annex” for the local partner’s manual
including new policies addressing all USG rules and
regulations and recommending whole sections to be
duplicated from the “model” NGO manual. Specific
changes updated the sections on internal controls,
particularly, cash control and payments, including
bank and petty cash reconciliations; travel advances;
authorization and approvals of expenditures; and
preparation and review of financial statements. The
organization’s finance director reviewed the revised
policies and procedures and finalized agreements in
phone calls and e-mail exchanges with the consultant.
A subsequent HRSA assessment was conducted in
November 2011 by a different team of reviewers and in-
cluded a follow-up financial compliance review. In the
follow-up report, the fiscal reviewer noted among the
organizational strengths, “an improvement in FAPPM
around internal controls, including procedures for a
hierarchy of signatory approvals, separation of duties,
and detailed explanations of allowable costs and unal-
lowable costs.” In addition, the reviewer noted that
the manual “addressed all donor requirements and
USG regulations.” Overall, by the time of the follow-
up assessment both of the original opportunities for
improvement identified at this local partner were re-
solved following HRSA-sponsored TA (Table 2).
Case study #3
In January 2010, an initial ClASS assessment was done
with a newly incorporated 3-year-old local NGO in
Botswana to which the Track 1.0 implementing part-
ner was in the process of transitioning its training pro-
grams as well as the related fiscal and administrative
functions. The NGO was to take over the training ser-
vices budget of around US $1.8 million from the Track
1.0 implementing partner. Unlike the previous 2 case
studies, the new local partner did not yet have full au-
tonomy from the Track 1.0 implementing partner, nor
did it meet the OGAC definition of “local partner.”
Many of the leadership and decision-making functions
for the new organization still resided with the Track 1.0
implementing partner.
During this assessment, the fiscal reviewer compli-
mented the Track 1.0 implementing partner on its com-
prehensive and detailed FAPPM while simultaneously
expressing concerns about the pace of the transition
of responsibility for implementing those policies and
practices to the new local partner staff. The consultant
recommended 10 areas of action to hasten transition
of program implementation to the new NGO (Table 2).
The HRSA ClASS team, Track 1.0 implementing partner
and local partner, discussed these recommendations in
a debriefing session at the end of the 2010 assessment,
which were captured in the HRSA report. The HRSA
project officer monitored the work of the Track 1.0 im-
plementing partner to provide guidance and TA during
the subsequent year of ongoing transition planning.
At the time of the follow-up financial management
review, 1 year later in January 2011, the HRSA project
officer identified the local partner as being further along
in becoming autonomous and in having the capacity to
be independently funded by the USG and HIV treat-
ment support program. The fiscal reviewer noted sig-
nificant progress in increasing finance-related staffing
and systems infrastructure in the local partner organi-
zation. This included hiring an international account-
ing firm to provide financial leadership support, senior
leadership training around grants management, and
increased finance team staffing and oversight. More ex-
perienced personnel filled new finance positions at the
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local partner organization. The fiscal reviewer praised
the local partner for the level of detail included and
the comprehensive nature of its FAPPM but suggested
testing compliance with those policies on the basis of
concerns raised in the first assessment.
Overall, 6 of the original 10 opportunities for im-
provement remained despite TA from the Track 1.0
implementing partner (Table 2), as noted in the follow-
up ClASS report. Also, 3 new areas of concern were
identified. Consequently, HRSA contracted 2 financial
management consultants to test 4 to 5 key policy areas,
test procurement policies and procedures against actual
practice and recommend systemic changes to address
any inconsistencies observed, and finalize the reclassi-
fication of specific financial transactions. The 2 consul-
tants developed a tool to assess the policies against
the actual practices on the basis of a review of the
existing FAPPM, Procurement Manual, assessments re-
ports, and external audits. The consultants worked
with the in-country CDC grants manager in the de-
velopment of the tool and eventually tested 30 policies
and procedures from the various manuals against ac-
tual practices to assess compliance. They also evalu-
ated progress on findings from the annual audit. Dur-
ing the 1-week period, the consultants simultaneously
provided training and guidance and facilitated a de-
briefing session with senior leadership from the CDC,
Track 1.0 implementing partner and local partner.
Based on their review, the consultants recommended
greater board involvement, the addition of a chief fi-
nancial officer, more structured procurement processes,
and acceleration of the software conversion process to
strengthen enactment of the NGO’s policies.
● Discussion
The use of the ClASS framework to support the transi-
tion of HRSA-supported Track 1.0 HIV care and treat-
ment programs appears successful in uncovering gaps
in capacity critical to transition and in strengthening
the financial management of USG funds at all 3 organi-
zations. Table 1 reflects 11 of the 15 most common finan-
cial management capacity gaps found in ClASS reports,
many unique to each organization, with the exception
of those related to the FAPPM that was common to all 3
local partners. The Figure shows the pathway from ini-
tial identification of opportunities for improvement to
their resolution through external TA. As seen in Table 2,
over time, all 3 local partners, with Track 1.0 imple-
menting partners’ and HRSA support when requested,
demonstrated stronger capacity for financial manage-
ment in ClASS-identified areas for improvement, albeit
at different paces. Inaugural assessment visits estab-
lished the systemic needs and built the initial relation-
ships and trust needed to facilitate the provision of
contextual and locally owned TA, which, along with
sustainability, is deemed critical to the medium and
long-term success of capacity-building activities.11-13
The follow-up assessment visit increased understand-
ing of the capacity and challenges faced by the local
partners, reinforced positive changes, and identified
any outstanding and new capacity gaps that needed
to be addressed. Partially due to their ability to meet
USG financial regulations and requirements, the 3 lo-
cal partners competed successfully to implement and
manage HIV care and treatment programs by the target
date of March 2012, with continued support from the
CDC and Track 1.0 implementing partners to close any
remaining capacity gaps.14
Track 1.0 implementing partners identified potential
local partners on the basis of compatibility with their
mission and organizational structure to meet their
client population expectations rather than to meet USG
criteria, requirements, and regulation.15 Consequently,
while the Zambian Track 1.0 implementing partner
could find suitable local partners, the Botswana Track
1.0 implementing partner had to incorporate a new
local partner to accommodate its own ongoing research
activities and in recognition of the small number of
NGOs with even smaller capacities in Botswana.16
Most newborn organizations struggle with new roles,
new relationships, and the fine-tuning of organiza-
tional structure and processes,17 which may explain the
greater number of arising and ongoing recommenda-
tions. Early establishment of policies and procedures,
financial indicators for external and internal monitor-
ing, and input of resources offer new organizations
some protection from early demise.17,18 Conversely, as
organizations age, they face reduced injections of re-
sources, vigilance in monitoring, and static policies,17,18
as somewhat found in the Zambian organizations.
The TA models between the 2 countries differed in
strategic approach. In Zambia, HRSA responded to
requests for TA on the basis of an identified need,19
whereas in Botswana it proactively provided TA in an-
ticipation of need. The 2 Zambian local partners quickly
exhausted the Track 1.0 implementing partner’s TA
resources and asked for direct HRSA support to re-
align their FAPPM to USG regulations. The third local
partner, in Botswana, had strong policies and proce-
dures adapted from the Track 1.0 implementing part-
ner, which it was not yet able to fully implement. Pos-
sible explanations for not asking HRSA for assistance
include not recognizing the need for external TA20 and
being diverted by the steep learning curve required of
new organizations.17
A sound financial objective and a combination of
strong, internally determined and donor-required poli-
cies provide the foundation for proficient financial
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management in the NGO sector.21 To that end, the
ClASS fiscal module integrated specific USG regula-
tions with other generally accepted accounting prac-
tices. New organizations, such as the local partner
in Botswana, need the gradual rather than swift
withdrawal of sponsors so that local boards can
assume greater responsibility and consolidate long-
term decisions.22 Yet, gradual withdrawal of support
by the sponsor can prolong reliance on the organi-
zation providing the required TA and can delay ad-
equate structuring, staffing, and training of the new
organization’s finance team. Explicit statements of ex-
pectations of capacity-building activities with funding
agreements that specify the required steps and donor
involvement beyond funding can better support build-
ing the capacity of new organizations.22
The mode of delivering TA around financial man-
agement differed between the 2 countries. Consultants
to the 2 Zambian programs provided a low-cost “desk
review” of policy and procedure manuals without
traveling to the country.22 The Zambian teams them-
selves worked on policy and manual revisions, with the
HRSA consultants playing the role of reviewers using
telephonic and e-mail communications.23 The ClASS
framework and TA approach used in Zambia were
consistent with what West et al24 cited in their exten-
sive review of published evaluations and relevant the-
ory as “effective technical assistance models,” which
are based on “two-way interactions, collaboration and
relationship-building.”(p922) In Botswana, delays in in-
tegrating recommendations necessitated on-site pres-
ence which, over time, appeared more conducive to
knowledge-building and role modeling in the provi-
sion of TA.25
The 2 organizations in Zambia, perhaps due to the
ages of the organizations, were better able to utilize
and absorb the TA to build their own capacity, re-
sulting in fewer subsequent recommendations for im-
provement. The Zambian local partners demonstrated
more “absorptive capacity,” a concept first introduced
more than 20 years ago by Cohen and Levinthal.26
Lewin et al27 point out that organizations with absorp-
tive capacity are more mature, with senior staff and
internalized systems and “organizational routines” in
place. Uli17 describes these routines as “repetitive, rec-
ognizable patterns of interdependent actions carried
out by multiple actors.”(p5) Lewin et al27 further argue
that such organizations not only have the ability to
expand on the basis of new ideas, but are more flexi-
ble about “sharing knowledge and superior practices
across the organization and reflecting, updating and
replicating.”(p87) The Zambian local partner’s finance
staff took ownership of the improvement processes, in-
cluding writing revisions to the policies and procedure
manuals and implementing internal finance staff train-
ings on the basis of those revisions. As a result, they
ultimately displayed more capacity to move the change
and transition process along more quickly. We hypothe-
size that in Botswana, fears around the “liability of new-
ness,” as Uli17 calls it, and the overall weak NGO sec-
tor in Botswana led the international partner to move
more slowly with transition, resulting in slow integra-
tion of the TA there and necessitating additional, more
intense and more expensive HRSA-supported on-site
training.
● Conclusions
Despite the overall successful capacity development
described in these case studies, some questions re-
main: Can TA approaches like those described in this
article, including the low-cost, more self-directed ap-
proach, lead to longer-term success as measured by
ongoing compliance with USG and/or other national
regulations? Will the absence of close monitoring of in-
digenous organizations by outside entities affect con-
sistent performance over time, especially in countries
with weaker NGO functioning? Do the theoretical as-
sertions hold up that a more mature organization is
a better choice for transitioning than a newly created
entity? Longitudinal follow-up is also needed to deter-
mine whether the capacity building achieved in cases
like those described here can be sustained in the face of
historically high staff turnover in organizations work-
ing in low-resource settings.
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